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Abstract: On a Parfit-inspired account of culpability, as the psychological connections between a 
person’s younger self and older self weaken, the older self’s culpability for a wrong committed 
by the younger self diminishes. Suppose we accept this account and also accept a culpability-
based upper limit on punishment severity. On this combination of views, we seem forced to 
conclude that perpetrators of distant past wrongs should either receive discounted punishments 
or be exempted from punishment entirely. This article develops a strategy for resisting this 
conclusion. I propose that, even if the perpetrators of distant past wrongs cannot permissibly be 
punished for the original wrongs, in typical cases they can permissibly be punished for their 
ongoing and iterated failures to rectify earlier wrongs. Having set out this proposal, I defend it 
against three objections, before exploring how much punishment it can justify. 
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Oskar Gröning worked as an SS administrator in the Auschwitz extermination camp during the 
second world war. He was responsible for, among other things, guarding, sorting and logging the 
belongings of those who had been sent to the gas chambers or admitted to the camp.
1
 Gröning 
escaped punishment in the aftermath of the war by concealing the nature of his wartime work, 
but in the 1980s he made his role at Auschwitz public. In 2015, following a change in German 
law that allowed for him to be prosecuted, he was tried as an accessory to the murder of at least 
300,000 people. He was found guilty and sentenced to four years’ imprisonment,2 a decision that 
was upheld on appeal.
3
 
                                                 
1
 Matthias Geyer, “An SS Officer Remembers: The Bookkeeper from Auschwitz”, Spiegel Online (09/05/2005), 
<http://web.archive.org/web/20070302085046/http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/0,1518,355188,00.
html>. 
2
 See “Oskar Gröning”, Trial International (08/05/2016), <https://trialinternational.org/latest-post/oskar-
groning/>. There have been two subsequent trials of Auschwitz personnel since Gröning’s conviction. In 2016, 
Reinhold Hanning, who had been an SS guard at Auschwitz, was convicted of aiding and abetting the murder 
of at least 170,000 people, though he passed away before an appeal could be heard, so never began the five-
year prison term to which he was sentenced. A third Auschwitz trial, of former SS medic Hubert Zafke, was 
terminated due to Zafke’s illness. On Hanning, see “Reinhold Hanning”, Trial International (09/08/2016), 
<https://trialinternational.org/latest-post/reinhold-hanning/> and “Reinhold Hanning: Convicted Nazi Guard 
Dies Before Going to Prison,” BBC News (01/06/2017), <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-
40122610>. On Zafke, see “Hubert Zafke”, Trial International (29/11/2016), 
<https://trialinternational.org/latest-post/hubert-zafke/> and “German court stops trial of paramedic who 
worked at Auschwitz”, Reuters (12/09/2017), <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-nazi-trial/german-
court-stops-trial-of-paramedic-who-worked-at-auschwitz-idUSKCN1BN1E6>. 
3
  “Bundesgerichtshof: Halfstrafe Gegen Oskar Gröning Ist Rechtskräftig”, Zeit Online (28/11/2016), 
<http://www.zeit.de/gesellschaft/zeitgeschehen/2016-11/bundesgerichtshof-oskar-groening-urteil-ns-
massenmord>. 
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Gröning’s sentence was not universally endorsed, even by those who testified against him.4 
Commentators raised a number of questions. Was Gröning a victim of bad moral luck?
5
  Ought 
he to have been offered mercy given his frail condition, his (rather heavily qualified) expressions 
of remorse,
6
 and the fact that he had to an extent sought to undermine holocaust denial by 
speaking publicly about his experiences?
7
 And finally: did his wrongs simply lie too far in the past 
for a normal punishment to be warranted? 
 
In this article, I address this last question, though in a more general form: should serious moral 
wrongs from the distant past be punished, and if so, should they be punished as severely as if 
they had been punished promptly? Or, as I will henceforth sometimes paraphrase this question, 
should distant past wrongs attract normal punishments?  
 
                                                 
4
 Melanie Hall, “Holocaust Survivor Criticises German Court for Decision to Jail ‘Bookkeeper of Auschwitz’,” 
The Telegraph (15/07/2015), 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/germany/11742517/Holocaust-suvivor-criticises-
German-court-for-decision-to-jail-bookkeeper-of-Auschwitz.html> and  Kashmira Gander, “Auschwitz 
Survivor Criticised for Saying SS Guard Oskar Groening Should Not Be Prosecuted”, The Independent 
(28/04/2015), <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/oskar-groening-trial-auschwitz-survivor-eva-
mozes-kor-criticised-by-co-plaintiffs-for-saying-ex-ss-10208797. html>. 
5
  See Roger Crisp, “The Luck of Oskar Groening”, Practical Ethics Blog (23/04/2015), 
<http://blog.practicalethics.ox.ac.uk/2015/04/the-luck-of-oskar-groening/>.  
6
 Gröning has admitted to feeling guilt for his role at Auschwitz and to having requested forgiveness from God 
but has denied that he was an active perpetrator in the killings, expressed reluctance to accept the label of 
‘accomplice’, and claimed that his participation was involuntary. See Geyer, “An SS Officer Remembers: The 
Bookkeeper from Auschwitz”, supra note 1.  
7
 Geyer, “An SS Officer Remembers”, supra note 1.  
  
4 
My answer will be given in five stages. In §I, I present a previously noted, though as-yet-
unexamined, argument for the view that distant past wrongs should not attract normal 
punishments—an argument for the view that perpetrators of distant past wrongs should be 
exempted from punishment or given less severe punishments than would have been warranted 
had they been punished promptly. In §II, I survey two possible replies to this argument, arguing 
that neither succeeds. In §III, I offer my own reply, which, I hold, at least partially undermines 
the case for punishment exemptions or discounts. In §IV, I respond to three objections to my 
reply. Finally, in §V, I consider how far my reply undermines the case for exemptions or 
discounts.  
 
Before proceeding to these tasks, however, I need to make three preliminary remarks. 
 
First, I am interested in the moral, not legal, justifiability of punishments for distant past wrongs. 
Moreover, I am interested not in whether such punishments can be morally justified under 
prevailing legal arrangements, but in whether they could be morally justified were the law to 
permit them, or were it possible, without cost, to reform the law in order to permit them. Many 
jurisdictions currently operate statutes of limitations that legally bar the punishment of at least 
some distant past crimes. If there is a moral obligation on states to comply with the law, and if 
those states cannot without cost reform the laws in question, they may have moral reasons not to 
punish distant past crimes. I set aside such reasons.   
 
Second, I also set aside pragmatic limits on the degree to which punishments can be tailored to 
individual circumstances. Actual criminal justice systems must often, in part for pragmatic 
reasons, adopt sentencing policies that gloss over some differences between offenders. To give 
  
5 
one example, they may need to adopt fixed minimum age limits for standing trial or receiving 
custodial sentences, even though it might be more desirable, absent practical constraints, to allow 
a case-by-case assessment of an individual's degree of maturity. Such fine-grained assessment may 
simply be unreasonably costly, or too prone to biases or inter-assessor variations. I assume that 
there are no such constraints on punishment. On this assumption, it is no objection to reducing 
punishment in a particular case that we could not reasonably expect actual criminal justice 
systems to make the kind of assessment of individualized circumstances on which the reduction 
is based.  
 
Third, I limit my focus to serious and culpable moral wrongs, for which the perpetrator has 
expressed no significant remorse, and which the perpetrator has made no significant attempt to 
rectify.
8
  I believe that these are the cases in which the moral case for punishing distant past 
wrongs is strongest, and I wish to present the view that distant past wrongs should attract normal 
punishments in its most plausible light.  
I. A CHALLENGE 
Whether distant past wrongs should attract normal punishments may depend on the purposes 
that punishment serves. Let us assume, as a starting point, that the purpose of punishment is 
retributive: criminal punishment serves to mete out suffering that is proportionate to the 
offender’s culpability.9 
                                                 
8
  I believe that it is debatable whether Gröning’s case falls within the scope of this limitation and will take no 
stance on this.  
9
 I use the unqualified term ‘retributivist’ to refer to what could more precisely be called ‘positive retributivist’ 
views. I return to negative retributivism below. 
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At first sight, distant past wrongs may seem to pose no great problem for retributivism. If 
offenders are culpable for a wrong at the time they commit it, they plausibly remain so 
indefinitely, as long as they have not rectified their wrong. Culpability comes with no expiration 
date.  
 
There is a complication, however. Suppose we accept a broadly Parfitian account of what matters 
in survival; suppose we accept that, as the psychological connections between a younger and older 
self weaken, the moral and prudential relationships between the younger and older self more 
closely approximate those between two different persons. Thus, for example, the younger self’s 
infliction of a harm on the older self becomes more and more similar, normatively speaking, to 
inflicting harm on another person, and the prevention of such a harm by a third party becomes 
more like a case of preventing harm to others, and less like a case of paternalism.  
 
Parfit argues for this view—henceforth the ‘connectedness’ account of what matters in survival—
chiefly by showing that, compared to competing accounts, it can better accommodate and 
rationalize our intuitive verdicts on a range of science fiction thought experiments.
10
 But the 
connectedness account also has some attractive implications in more everyday cases. For 
example, it is able to account for the widely held intuition that it would normally be less bad for 
a serious harm to befall one’s much older self than to befall one now. That is, it seems, able to 
                                                 
10
  Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), ch. 13.  
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accommodate and rationalize our intuitive discounting of distant future harms.
11
 It also has 
possibly attractive implications for the morality of abortion; it is consistent with the view, which 
many find plausible, that abortion becomes wrong, and then more seriously wrong, as the fetus 
develops stronger psychological connections to the live-born person it will become.
12
  
 
The connectedness account of what matters in survival is a view regarding how psychological 
connectedness affects morality and prudence in general. But, since it is meant to apply to all 
moral and prudential relationships, it entails a parallel, more specific view regarding how 
psychological connectedness affects culpability in particular. It entails that, as the psychological 
connections between a person’s younger and older selves weaken, the older self’s culpability for 
a wrong committed by the younger self diminishes. Call this the connectedness account of 
culpability. 
 
Suppose we accept the connectedness account of culpability. And suppose we are now 
confronted with ‘the Octogenarian’, an 80-year-old who committed a serious and culpable wrong 
as a 20-year-old, but who is only weakly psychologically connected to his 20-year-old self. We 
may assume that the Octogenarian has few memories of, and shares few psychological traits with, 
his 20-year-old self, and that the 20-year-old had few expectations, hopes or desires regarding his 
80-year-old self. 
 
                                                 
11
  Parfit notes that his view can rationalize such discounting, though he does not present it as an advantage of the 
view. See his Reasons and Persons, §§103-5, supra note 10. 
12
  Again, Parfit notes this possible implication of his view, but does not clearly present it as an attractive 
implication. See his Reasons and Persons, §108, supra note 10. 
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Is the Octogenarian fully culpable for his distant past wrong?  
 
It is perhaps possible to maintain that he is, even if one thinks that psychological connectedness 
can affect culpability. One could, for instance, argue that there is a range over which the 
psychological connections between a younger and older self remain sufficiently strong that there 
is no reduction in culpability; there may be a threshold level of disconnectedness that must be 
reached before culpability begins to attenuate. Or one could hold that only loss of certain kinds 
of connectedness diminishes culpability. For example, it may be that culpability is reduced only 
when one distances oneself from one’s earlier wrong or rejects the motivations that produced it. 
 
However, as the connectedness account of culpability is standardly understood, any significant 
reduction in psychological connectedness between an earlier and later self will be sufficient to 
cause some reduction in culpability for the earlier self’s wrong. This sort of view seems at one 
point to have been endorsed by Parfit himself. In Reasons and Persons, he speculated that 
“[w]hen some convict is now less closely connected to himself at the time of his crime, he 
deserves less punishment. If the connections are very weak, he may deserve none”.13 There is no 
hint here—or in the surrounding text—that culpability is diminished only once a certain threshold 
is crossed, or only when a certain kind of connection is lost. 
 
On this interpretation of the connectedness account, which I will henceforth adopt, we must say 
either that the Octogenarian is not at all culpable for the wrong committed by the 20-year-old, or 
that only some of the 20-year-old’s culpability is inherited by the Octogenarian. If the former, 
any punishment would be disproportionate, so to conform to the requirements of retributivism, 
                                                 
13
 Parfit, Reasons and Persons, p. 326, supra note 10. 
  
9 
the Octogenarian would need to be exempted from punishment. If the latter, the maximal 
amount of punishment that qualifies as proportionate will be reduced, so, on retributivism, the 
Octogenarian ought to be given a reduced punishment (a ‘punishment discount’).14 
 
This result can be generalized to any perpetrator of a wrong who is less psychologically connected 
to his self at the time of the crime than he would have been had he been punished promptly—
something which is plausibly true of all actual perpetrators of distant past wrongs, as well as some 
perpetrators of more recent wrongs who have, since their wrongdoing, undergone a more sudden 
loss of connectedness, for example, due to radical memory loss or personality change.
15
 In any 
such case, there will, on the present elucidation of the connectedness account of culpability, have 
been a reduction in culpability, and we are assuming no pragmatic barriers to case-by-case 
tailoring of punishments to individual circumstances, including individual culpability.  
 
The result can also be generalized to many theories of punishment that do not posit a retributive 
purpose for punishment. Many such theories nevertheless include a culpability-based upper limit 
on justified punishment. Thus, suppose the purpose of punishment is not to inflict proportionate 
suffering but is rather to prevent re-offending by the punished individual, deter offending by 
others, or communicate censure. Most would accept that there are constraints on how these 
purposes may permissibly be realized, and one constraint, plausibly, is that the punishment 
                                                 
14
  I assume here that there is no respect in which the perpetrator of the distant past wrong has become more 
culpable over time, an assumption that I will later question.  
15
  In the following discussion, though, I focus only on cases in which psychological connections are weakened 
gradually across an extended period of time. The arguments I make would, I think, play out quite differently 
in cases of sudden psychological change.  
  
10 
should not inflict more suffering than would be proportionate to the offender’s culpability. This 
is often referred to as the ‘negative retributivist constraint’, and I will adopt that terminology here. 
If culpability diminishes over time in the way I have been suggesting, the negative retributivist 
constraint will tighten over time—that is, the maximum amount of punishment that can be 
imposed without violating the constraint will be reduced. So again, on the connectedness account 
of culpability, either a punishment exemption or punishment discount ought to be given. 
II. RESPONDING TO THE CHALLENGE 
Should we, then, give punishment discounts or exemptions to the perpetrators of distant past 
wrongs? In Reasons and Persons, Parfit took it to be plausible that we should, and offered a case 
to support this view: 
Suppose that a man aged ninety, one of the few rightful holders of the Nobel Peace Prize, 
confesses that it was he who, at the age of twenty, injured a policeman in a drunken brawl. 
Though this was a serious crime, this man may not now deserve to be punished.
16
  
However, it is not clear that this case supports the application of punishment discounts or 
exemptions based on diminished psychological connectedness. As Allen Buchanan has noted, it 
is possible to account for the plausibility of the view that a punishment discount or exemption 
should be applied in this case in other ways.
17
 We may be inclined to assume, for example, that 
through his good works the Nobel Laureate has, in effect, made some amends for, and thereby 
                                                 
16
 Parfit, Reasons and Persons, p. 326, supra note 10. 
17
 Allen Buchanan, “Advance Directives and the Personal Identity Problem”, Philosophy & Public Affairs 17(4) 
(1988): pp. 277–302, at p. 291. 
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partly rectified, his earlier wrong. It may be that it is this partial rectification that justifies the 
discount. 
 
Moreover, in other cases of distant past wrongdoing, it is less clear that punishment should be 
discounted. Recall the case of Oskar Gröning, with which we began. Gröning does not appear to 
have been actively involved in the killings at Auschwitz, and there is some evidence that he 
objected to some of what he witnessed there.
18
 But consider a variant of this case in which the 
former Nazi had been an active and enthusiastic participant in mass killings. Suppose also that 
this individual had done nothing to rectify his wrongs, showed no signs of remorse, and remained 
in excellent health at the time of sentencing. It is not intuitively clear to me that a penal discount 
would be warranted in this case, even if the psychological connections between the younger Nazi 
and his much older self are weak. 
 
Might it, then, be possible to resist the application of punishment discounts or exemptions for 
distant past crimes, even while endorsing the connectedness account of culpability? In this 
section, I consider two options for doing so.  
 
The first option is to reject all theories of punishment that either posit a retributive purpose of 
punishment or incorporate a negative retributivist constraint. Rejecting such theories undercuts 
the positive case for punishment discounts or exemptions that I gave above.  
                                                 
18
  Gröning claims that he requested transfer away from the camp on a number of occasions, though it is not clear 
whether this was motivated by discomfort with the means via which some killings were carried out or discomfort 
with the fact of the killings. See Geyer, “An SS Officer Remembers: The Bookkeeper from Auschwitz”, supra 
note 1. 
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This option is not appealing. For one thing, the thought that there is a culpability-based upper 
limit on justified punishment is an intuitively compelling one; punishing innocents and heavily 
punishing individuals who are only mildly culpable seem intuitively objectionable, and the 
existence of a negative retributivist constraint provides a credible explanation of their 
objectionability.
19
 
 
Moreover, as it happens, the leading non-retributivist theories of punishment face other 
difficulties in justifying the punishment of distant past crimes even where they do not incorporate 
a negative retributivist constraint.  
 
Consider what we may call ‘anti-recidivist’ penal theories, according to which the purpose of 
punishment is to prevent re-offending by the punished individual, whether through rehabilitation, 
incapacitation, or what is known as ‘specific’ deterrence—deterring the punished individual from 
future offending.
20
 On these theories, it is difficult to see why distant past crimes should typically 
be punished. It is unusual, in cases where a crime was committed long ago, that the perpetrator 
retains the disposition and ability to re-offend. Thus, the risk of recidivism will typically be too 
                                                 
19
  It might be thought that it is sufficient, for the purposes of accommodating these intuitions, to accept a 
defeasible variant of the negative retributivist constraint—a constraint that allows for disproportionate 
punishments in exceptional cases. However, even a defeasible variant of the constraint will be sufficient to 
justify punishment discounts or exemptions for most distant past wrongs. Thus, shifting to such a constraint 
does little to diminish the impact of the connectedness account of culpability.  
20
 I include under this banner views according to which punishment is justified as a form of self-defense.  
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low to justify the costs of imposing punishment.
21
 Moreover, even if the offender does continue 
to pose a significant risk of recidivism, it is unlikely that we will possess sufficient evidence for 
this to justify punishment. Certainly, the mere fact that the individual has committed a wrong in 
the distant past will have little evidential value.
22
 
 
Consider next the view that the purpose of punishment is general deterrence—deterring 
wrongdoing by others. Again, it seems unlikely that this goal would be advanced much by 
punishing wrongs from the distant past. Compare two different punishment schemes: in the first, 
all serious and culpable wrongs besides those committed in the distant past are, insofar as 
reasonably possible, punished; in the second, all serious and culpable wrongs, including those 
from the distant past, are punished, as far as reasonably possible. The second scheme can be 
expected to have a somewhat stronger deterrent effect than the first: potential wrongdoers will 
recognize, under that scheme, that they cannot avoid punishment by evading it until such time 
as their wrong lies in the distant past. However, there are two reasons to suppose that any 
additional deterrent effect associated with the second scheme will be slight. First, the number of 
additional wrongs punished under this scheme is likely to be very small, since there would 
presumably be very few offenders who would evade punishment until their wrongs lie in the 
distant past, and then succumb to it. Second, the additional punishments imposed under this 
scheme are, from the perspective of the time of the offence, punishments that lie far in the future. 
                                                 
21
 Allen Buchanan makes the same point in relation to Parfit’s Nobel Prizewinner case. See Buchanan, “Advance 
Directives and the Personal Identity Problem”, supra note 17. 
22
 Even where distant past wrongdoing has no evidential value, it could play a role in justifying anti-recidivist 
punishment. For example, this history may make the offender morally liable to anti-recidivist measures by 
removing or loosening a deontological constraint that would otherwise render them permissible. 
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Given evidence that people tend to discount distant future harms,
23
 and that the deterrent effects 
of even prompt punishments are typically modest,
24
 such distant future punishments are unlikely 
to have a substantial deterrent effect on prospective wrongdoers. (The probable weak marginal 
deterrent effect of extending punishments to include distant past wrongs has, indeed, been 
invoked as basis for accepting statutes of limitations.
25
)  
 
Finally, consider communicative theories, according to which punishment serves to 
communicate censure. These accounts run into difficulties similar to those faced by retributivist 
accounts. On communicative accounts, censure must be communicated to an individual who is 
culpable for the crime. Thus, if we accept a connectedness account of culpability, perpetrators 
of distant past wrongs are either not an appropriate object of censure (since they are no longer at 
all culpable) or are no longer an appropriate object of such severe censure (because their 
culpability has been attenuated). A case for punishment discounts or exemptions would thus 
survive a move to a communicative theory, even if this theory were to eschew a negative 
retributivist constraint.   
 
                                                 
23
  See e.g., Tobias Kalenscher and Cyriel M.A. Pennartz, “Is a Bird in the Hand Worth Two in the Future? The 
Neuroeconomics of Intertemporal Decision-Making”, Progress in Neurobiology 84(3) (2008):  pp. 284-315. 
24
 Two recent reviews of the evidence support this claim. See Daniel S. Nagin, “Deterrence: A Review of the 
Evidence by a Criminologist for Economists”, Annual Review of Economics 5 (2013): pp. 83–105; and Aaron 
Chalfin and Justin McCrary, “Criminal Deterrence: A Review of the Literature”, Journal of Economic 
Literature 55(1) (2017): pp. 5–48.  
25
  See, for this argument, Yair Listokin, “Efficient Time Bars: A New Rationale for the Existence of Statutes of 
Limitations in Criminal Law”, The Journal of Legal Studies 31(1) (2002): pp. 99–118. 
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Let us turn, then, to a second option for resisting penal discounts or exemptions—an option 
alluded to, though not developed, by Parfit himself: we could argue that, even if the perpetrator 
of a distant past wrong is no longer culpable for that wrong, she is culpable as an accomplice to 
that wrong.
26
 This suggestion could be coupled with the recently defended view that accomplices 
are not, by virtue of being ‘merely’ accomplices, thereby less culpable than the principal agent of 
a wrong.
27
 The conjunction of these views would allow us to preserve the result that the older self 
is, or at least may be, as culpable as the younger self who committed the wrong, notwithstanding 
any reduction in connectedness.  
 
The difficulty with this strategy is that, even if some kinds of complicity fully preserve culpability, 
in the sense that the accomplice is ceteris paribus just as culpable as the principal agent of the 
wrong, the specific kind of complicity involved in the cases of interest to us here does not. The 
most plausible explanations of why an older self is an accomplice to the wrong committed by her 
younger self are that (i) she benefits in some ways from that wrong, (ii) she to some degree shares 
the attitudes that motivated that wrongdoing, or (iii) some combination of (i) and (ii). However, 
even if we accept that one of these explanations succeeds, something many would deny,
28
 we 
                                                 
26
 See Parfit, Reasons and Persons, p. 326, supra note 10, and, for discussion, Rebecca Dresser, “Personal 
Identity and Punishment”, Boston University Law Review 70 (1990): pp. 395-446, at pp. 425-27. 
27
 Chiara Lepora and Robert E. Goodin, On Complicity and Compromise (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2013), p. 34, esp. note 9; Katrien Devolder, “U.S. Complicity and Japan’s Wartime Medical Atrocities: Time 
for a Response”, The American Journal of Bioethics 15(6) (2015): pp. 40–9, at p. 44, note 4; Victor Tadros, 
“Permissibility in a World of Wrongdoing”, Philosophy & Public Affairs 44(2) (2016): pp. 101–32. 
28
  That these kinds of association confer complicity could be denied on the grounds that complicity requires 
causal contribution. See, for this view, John Gardner, “Complicity and Causality”, Criminal Law and 
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would not normally regard the kind of complicity produced by such associations as fully 
culpability-preserving.
29
 Indeed, we would not normally regard them as conferring enough 
culpability to justify any punishment. Consider a case in which a parent commits a theft from 
which his child, as an adult, benefits. Suppose also that the child, as an adult, shares some of the 
attitudes that motivated the parent to commit the theft: perhaps, for example, she is just as 
disinclined to respect the law and the property rights of others. We would not, in this case, say 
that the child is as culpable as her parent. Indeed, we would not think that the child possesses 
any degree of culpability sufficient to justify punishment. 
III. THE RECURSIVE ACCOUNT 
I propose a third strategy for resisting the application of punishment exemptions or discounts to 
perpetrators of distant past wrongs.  My suggestion is that we might be permitted to punish such 
individuals not on the basis that they are culpable for the initial wrongdoing, nor on the basis that 
they are culpable accomplices to that wrongdoing, but on the basis that they have been guilty of 
ongoing wrongdoing in the intervening years.  
 
Why think that the perpetrators of distant past crimes have been guilty of ongoing wrongdoing? 
My answer begins from the contention that, when one commits a serious and culpable wrong, 
one normally acquires a moral duty to rectify that wrong. I wish to remain neutral between 
                                                 
Philosophy 1(2) (2007): pp. 127–141; Lepora and Goodin, On Complicity and Compromise, supra note 27; 
and Björn Petersson, “Co-Responsibility and Causal Involvement”, Philosophia 41(3) (2013): pp. 847–866. 
29
 Dresser, “Personal Identity and Punishment,” pp. 425-427, supra note 26, argues for a similar but stronger 
claim. She suggests that one can be culpably complicit in another’s wrong only if one “chose to participate” (p. 
427) in that wrong. A future self can, she claims, make no such choice in relation to a past self’s wrong. 
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different plausible views regarding what kinds of deeds can rectify a past wrong, but candidates 
would include mitigating, terminating or reversing the harm that one has wrongfully imposed; 
compensating for any harm that remains unmitigated; apologizing to one’s victim or her loved 
ones; expressing condemnation of or remorse for one’s past wrong; submitting to punishment 
for one’s wrong; and performing deeds that are in some sense comparable in moral significance 
to one’s wrong, but positive, rather than negative, in moral valence.30 People will reasonably 
disagree about whether, how, and to what degree different wrongs can be rectified. However, 
regardless what reasonable stance one takes on these matters, it is plausible that the perpetrators 
of the most serious and culpable moral wrongs can perform some deeds that would significantly 
rectify their wrongs, and that, where this is so, they often fall under a moral obligation to perform 
the said deeds, or a subset thereof, in order to (partially) rectify their wrong.   
 
These thoughts suggest that if, as I have been assuming throughout, the perpetrator of a distant 
past wrong has never made any significant attempt at rectification, he is likely to have been guilty 
of a further wrong since his commission of the original wrong, namely, the wrong of failing to at 
least partially rectify that wrong.
31
  
                                                 
30
  For illuminating discussions of various candidate forms of rectification, see e.g., Stephen P. Garvey, 
“Punishment as Atonement”, UCLA Law Review 46 (1998): pp. 1801-1858; Philip Pettit, “Republican Theory 
and Criminal Punishment”, Utilitas 9(1) (1997): pp. 59–79; Todd N. Karhu, “Non-Compensable Harms”, 
Analysis, online (2018). 
31
  It might be claimed that, not only is the failure of rectification a further wrong, it also aggravates the initial 
wrong, for example, by increasing the amount of harm that it causes to the victims and their loved ones. See, 
for discussion of a similar claim, Nick Smith, Justice Through Apologies: Remorse, Reform, and Punishment 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), esp. at pp. 186-187. My subsequent argument does not require 
me to take any view on whether failures of rectification aggravate the initial wrong.    
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Now of course, if a connectedness account of what matters in survival holds, this obligation to 
rectify the initial wrong will dissolve over time as psychological connectedness weakens, just as 
culpability for the initial wrong weakens. Eventually, expecting someone to rectify a past wrong 
will be equivalent to expecting her to rectify someone else’s wrong. It may be, to return to our 
earlier example, that the Octogenarian no longer has any obligation to rectify the wrong he 
committed when he was 20. If so, then the Octogenarian commits no further wrong by failing to 
rectify his initial wrong. Still, it is plausible that, for some time beyond the age of 20, the 
Octogenarian was under an obligation to rectify his initial wrong.  
 
To fix matters, let’s suppose that the Octogenarian’s obligation to rectify his initial wrong 
persisted for twenty years from the commission of that wrong. He remained under this obligation 
until the age of 40. Suppose further that during these 20 years, he did nothing to fulfil this 
obligation—nothing to rectify the wrong. He was thus guilty of a further moral wrong.  
 
What do we say about this person beyond the age of 40? Do we have to say that he is no longer 
guilty of any wrongdoing, since he no longer has any obligation to rectify his initial wrong? Not 
obviously, since we can plausibly say that he still has a duty to rectify his secondary wrong; his 
wrong of failing to rectify the initial crime. This is a wrong that he was still committing up until 
the age of 40, and it is plausible that he will, for some number of further years, remain under an 
obligation to rectify it. Again, to fix matters, let us suppose that this duty will persist for a further 
20 years and that, if he does nothing to rectify the wrong during these 20 years, he will be guilty 
of a further wrong—another wrong of failing to rectify an earlier wrong. This wrong is one that 
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the Octogenarian was committing up to the age of 60 and will give rise to a new obligation to 
rectify that persists beyond that age. 
 
We could keep iterating this reasoning and get the result that the Octogenarian has in fact been 
guilty of ongoing failures to rectify earlier wrongs. Initially, the failure was a failure to rectify the 
original wrong. Subsequently, the failures were failures to rectify earlier failures of rectification. 
 
I will refer to the above explanation for why perpetrators of distant past crimes may remain 
culpable as the recursive account.
32
 I make two claims on behalf of this account. First, that it will 
often justify some punishment for perpetrators of distant past wrongs, even in cases where the 
individual is no longer at all culpable for the initial wrong. Second, that it will often diminish the 
                                                 
32
  For somewhat similar explanations of why present people or nations bear obligations in relation to historical 
injustices, see Bernard R. Boxill, “A Lockean Argument for Black Reparations”, The Journal of Ethics 7(1) 
(2003): pp. 63–91; George Sher, “Transgenerational Compensation”, Philosophy & Public Affairs 33(2) 
(2005): pp. 181–200; Daniel Butt, “Nations, Overlapping Generations and Historic Injustice”, American 
Philosophical Quarterly 43(4) (2006): pp. 357–367; and Andrew I. Cohen, “Compensation for Historic 
Injustices: Completing the Boxill and Sher Argument”, Philosophy & Public Affairs 37(1) (2009): pp. 81–102. 
Note that these authors are partly, and in the case of Sher and Cohen primarily, concerned not with how a 
perpetrator’s culpability is transmitted forward in time, but rather with how a victim’s claim to compensation is 
transmitted forward in time—and, in the case of interest to these authors, across generations. The transmission 
of the claim to compensation could also be an issue in the cases of interest to me here if one thinks (i) that 
rectification for a crime must take the form of compensating its original victim and either (ii) the victim(s) of 
the original crime have since died, or (iii) there has been a weakening in psychological connectedness between 
the victim’s younger and older self. I am inclined to reject (i), and thus to regard the transmission of claims to 
compensation as a non-issue in the cases of interest to me here. However, I am, unsurprisingly, sympathetic to 
the view that, if it is an issue, it can be resolved in the way suggested by these authors. 
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punishment discount that should be applied to perpetrators of distant past wrongs who remain 
somewhat culpable for the initial wrong.  
 
The case in favor of these claims is straightforward. 
 
If the recursive account is correct, then there is a plausible retributive justification for punishing 
the perpetrators of many distant past wrongs. Like our Octogenarian, these perpetrators remain 
culpable for at least some of their recent failures of rectification, so ought to be subjected to 
punishments that are proportionate to this culpability, over and above punishment they are due 
for any residual culpability for the initial wrong.  
 
Similarly, the recursive account allows us to furnish credible anti-recidivist, general deterrent and 
communicative justifications for punishment. In punishing the Octogenarian, for instance, we 
would arguably be forcing him to rectify his recent wrongs of non-rectification, thus putting an 
end to the ongoing wrongdoing. It is plausible that we would also significantly deter others from 
continuing to leave past wrongs unrectified, since the Octogenarian’s recent failures of 
rectification are, in effect, being promptly punished. Additionally, in punishing the Octogenarian, 
we would perhaps express appropriate censure for the wrong of leaving past wrongs unrectified. 
Moreover, the Octogenarian’s ongoing culpability for failures of rectification would help to 
loosen any negative retributivist limit that these theories impose. 
 
Nevertheless, three significant objections could be raised to my claims, and it is to these that I 
now turn.  
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IV. OBJECTIONS 
The first of these objections holds that, even if failing to rectify a wrong is itself a wrong, it is not 
the sort of wrong for which punishment could be justified.  
 
This objection might be supported by appealing to prevailing criminal justice practices. Our 
criminal justice systems frequently do treat failures of rectification as an aggravating factor in 
sentencing; punishment for a crime may be more severe if the offender has done little or nothing 
to rectify it. However, our criminal justice systems do not normally treat failures of rectification 
as independently punishable crimes, such that states could be justified in punishing failures of 
rectification even if, for one reason or another, they could not be justified in punishing the initial 
crime. To the extent that one thinks our criminal justice systems are somewhat responsive to 
moral reasons, one might think this provides some evidence for the view that failures of 
rectification are indeed not independently punishable wrongs.  
 
On the other hand, however, none of the standard grounds for regarding a wrong as non-
punishable clearly rules out the punishment of failures of rectification. For example, failures of 
rectification may be quite serious wrongs, so they could not universally be deemed unpunishable 
on the basis of their triviality. Similarly, wrongs of non-rectification do not always lie within the 
private sphere in a way that would set them beyond the proper sphere of outside influence. They 
are also not always such that their prohibition would be impossible or costly to enforce.  
 
Moreover, the fact that current legal arrangements do not permit the punishment of failures of 
rectification does not, I think, have much, if any, evidential significance. After all, it may be that 
we do not currently punish failures of rectification because in almost all cases in which we might 
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wish to do so, we can achieve the same result by simply treating them as aggravating factors in 
punishing the initial wrong. There are no commonly encountered circumstances in which we 
would need to punish failures of rectification as separate wrongs.  
 
Let me turn, then, to the second and third objections; these raise a common set of issues, and I 
will deal with them together. The second objection holds that, if the recursive account justifies 
punishment, it justifies punishment of the wrong wrong. Intuitively, if the perpetrator of a distant 
past wrong ought to be punished, she ought to be punished for that wrong, not for subsequent 
failures of rectification.  
 
The third objection maintains that my recursive account implausibly proliferates the number of 
wrongs that the perpetrator of a distant past wrong has perpetrated. In describing how the 
recursive account plays out in relation to the Octogenarian, I appealed to a series of three failures 
of rectification, each extending over a period of 20 years. But, of course, it would be possible, by 
shortening the length of each iteration, to describe many—perhaps infinitely many—alternative 
and overlapping series of wrongs, and it is not clear what basis we could have for preferring one 
series of iterated wrongs to the others. It might thus seem that the proponent of the recursive 
account is committed to holding that many perpetrators of distant past wrongs are guilty of 
committing an enormous number of wrongs.  
 
These objections raise difficult questions about how to individuate wrongs that I cannot settle 
here. My response will instead be to simply note that there is a plausible way of delineating the 
wrongs in play in these cases that substantially de-fangs—even if it does not entirely undermine—
these objections. 
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I have until now presented the initial wrong, the subsequent failures to rectify that wrong, and the 
further failures to rectify those failures of rectification, as distinct wrongs, but they may be closer 
to one another than my presentation to this point has suggested; these wrongs may all be 
constituents of a single composite wrong. Consider a case in which as a youth, a now-old man 
seriously assaulted another, and has subsequently done nothing to rectify either that wrongful 
assault or the intervening failures of rectification. Note, first, that, if we characterize them 
generically enough, the initial wrong and the subsequent failures of rectification can all be 
understood as wrongs of the same kind. We might, for example, characterize this kind of wrong 
as ‘acting so as to infringe, without rectification, a person’s rights’.33 Note, second, that, once 
characterized in this way, it seems plausible to regard these wrongs as parts of a single, temporally 
extended whole; the man initially acts so as to infringe, without rectification, the rights of his 
victim through committing an assault, and then continues to perpetrate that same wrong through 
his subsequent failures of rectification. Finally, note, third, that it is plausible that this overarching 
wrong is at least part of what we would have been punishing had we punished the man promptly, 
and also that this is the wrong we would now punish if we now follow the guidance of the recursive 
account. True, we would now be punishing a different part of the wrong than the part we would 
have punished had we punished the man promptly. But punishing different parts of a single 
wrong may seem less troubling than punishing entirely distinct wrongs. 
 
                                                 
33
  I do not claim that all of the wrongness of the initial wrong can be satisfactorily captured by this generic 
specification; perhaps there are also other kinds of wrongs committed initially. For example, perhaps part of 
the initial wrong consists specifically in initiating a rights infringement. 
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In this way, subsuming the initial wrong and subsequent failures of rectification under a single, 
composite wrong diminishes the force of the objection that my recursive account recommends 
punishing the wrong wrong. It may also diminish the force of the concern that the account 
implausibly proliferates the number of wrongs that the wrongdoer commits, for if the manifold 
wrongs are all also parts of a single larger wrong, their great number seems less troubling. There 
are, after all, many familiar wrongs that can be decomposed into infinitely many sub-wrongs. 
Temporally extended wrongs of omission seem to be like this. Most of us plausibly commit the 
temporally extended wrong of failing to substantially alleviate the suffering of the poorest citizens 
of the world at low cost to ourselves, a wrong that consists, presumably, of many—perhaps 
infinitely many—less extended wrongs of the same kind. 
 
There is also a second line of response to the second and third objections. Even if the recursive 
account does implausibly recommend punishing the wrong wrong and does implausibly 
proliferate the number of wrongs that the wrongdoer commits, it may nevertheless be correct. 
 
One reason for this is that the recursive account may in fact minimize the overall counter-
intuitiveness of the connectedness account of culpability. Given the connectedness account, 
which we are assuming, I think our choice may be between (1) rejecting the recursive account 
and accepting what many will regard as a counter-intuitively low level of punishment in cases like 
the modified version of the Gröning case that I discussed in section II, and (2) accepting the 
recursive account and thus endorsing an intuitively more acceptable level of punishment in such 
cases, although at the cost of accepting counter-intuitive implications regarding the number of 
wrongs committed and nature of the wrong for which punishment is being given. Depending on 
how we weigh these two kinds of counter-intuitiveness, the latter may be preferable. 
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V. HOW MUCH PUNISHMENT? 
Suppose my claims regarding the recursive account hold good: the account can often justify some 
punishment, even in cases where the individual is not at all culpable for her distant past wrong, 
and it often diminishes the size of the punishment discount that should be given in cases where 
culpability for the initial wrong is reduced, but not to zero. A further question that arises is: how 
far does the account roll back the argument for penal discounts or exemptions? That is, how 
much (additional) punishment does the recursive account justify, when it justifies some? 
 
I cannot develop a full answer to this question here, but I wish to end by mentioning four factors 
that will be relevant to answering it. In discussing these four factors, I will continue to refer to the 
initial wrong and the subsequent failures of rectification as distinct wrongs, even though I have 
just suggested that they can be subsumed under a single, overarching wrong. I take it that these 
can be separate wrongs while also being parts of a single, larger wrong. Any readers not convinced 
by this should interpret my references to these separate wrongs as references to parts of the larger 
wrong.  
A. The Lesser Wrongness of Non-rectification 
The first factor that will influence the amount of punishment that can be justified, on the recursive 
account, is the degree to which culpability diminishes with each iteration of the cycle of 
wrongdoing and failure to rectify. This will depend in part on the relative seriousness of (i) 
committing a wrong, and (ii) failing to rectify it. 
 
Suppose that failing to rectify a wrong is typically a less serious wrong, other things being equal, 
than was the wrong that remains unrectified (I henceforth refer to this view as the lesser 
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wrongness of non-rectification). In that case, we might expect that a person’s culpability will 
normally diminish with every iteration of the cycle of wrongdoing and failure to rectify.  
 
The lesser wrongness of rectification yields intuitively plausible verdicts regarding at least some 
cases. Suppose that the day before yesterday I stole an innocent person’s phone. 34  Then, 
yesterday, an opportunity arose to rectify this wrong by returning the phone, issuing an apology, 
and compensating for the inconvenience. I did not take this opportunity. On which day did the 
most serious wrong occur, yesterday or the day before? The day before yesterday, I would think.  
 
Moreover, several principled arguments can be offered for the lesser wrongness of non-
rectification. Let me mention just one, which appeals to the thought that most wrongs cannot be 
fully rectified. Let us say that a wrong is fully rectified if not committing the wrong is morally 
equivalent, in the overall seriousness of the wrong(s) committed, to committing the wrong and 
then rectifying it. Most wrongs cannot be fully rectified in this way. This suggests that committing 
a wrong will typically be a more serious wrong than failing to rectify it simply because it has a 
greater moral opportunity cost. The best alternative to committing a wrong (that is, not 
committing it) is better than the best alternative to not rectifying a wrong (that is, partially rectifying 
it). Thus, committing the wrong involves a greater moral loss relative to the best available 
alternative.  
                                                 
34
  I choose a theft as the initial wrong because this is arguably the type of wrong that is most fully rectifiable, and 
in relation to which it is thus perhaps most plausible to think that failures of rectification would be as seriously 
wrong as the initial wrong.  
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B. Repetition/Temporal Extension   
The lesser wrongness of non-rectification holds that, other things being equal, failing to rectify a 
wrong is (typically) less wrong than the initial wrong. But other things are not equal in my 
recursive story. Whereas the initial wrong, in cases of distant past wrongdoing, is typically a single, 
short-lived wrong, the failures of rectification invoked by my recursive account are most plausibly 
understood as either recurrent or temporally extended wrongs. It is not that an individual 
commits a wrong and then commits a one-off short-lived further wrong of failing to rectify that 
wrong. Rather, she commits many individual wrongs (which we might think of occurring when 
an opportunity to rectify the wrong arises and is not taken), or a single but ongoing wrong that 
extends over many years.  
 
The repeated and/or temporally extended nature of these failures of rectification plausibly 
increases their overall seriousness. Other things being equal, it makes them more serious than 
one-off, non-extended wrongs, and this will in turn tend to make the perpetrator’s culpability 
greater.  
 
Precisely how much influence this factor exerts on the amount of punishment that may be 
imposed will depend on complex questions regarding how we individuate failures of rectification, 
and how we aggregate seriousness of wrongdoing—and overall culpability—across these failures 
(or across time, if the failures are temporally extended).   
 
On the question of individuation: Should we say that the wrongdoer commits a further separate 
wrong on each day, or each hour, or each minute that he could (partially) rectify the wrong and 
fails to do so? Or should we think of the wrong of non-rectification as a continuous, temporally 
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extended wrong? Does wrongdoing occur only at times where the possibility of rectifying the past 
wrong comes to the agent’s mind, or might reasonably be expected to do so? Or is the wrongdoer 
continuously guilty of this wrong? 
 
On the question of aggregation: Are two equivalent wrongs of non-rectification collectively 
precisely twice as serious as each alone? (Alternatively, assuming that the wrong is instead a 
temporally extended one, is twice the length of temporally extended wrongdoing precisely twice 
as serious?) Or is the increase in seriousness of wrongdoing over time (or with repeat 
occurrences) sub- or supra-linear?
35
 Further, does culpability aggregate in the same way as 
seriousness of wrongdoing?  
 
I cannot resolve these questions here. Instead, I will limit myself to making four hopefully 
uncontroversial observations. 
 
First, the repeated and/or temporally extended nature of the wrongs of non-rectification does 
increase their (collective) seriousness relative to a situation in which there was only a single non-
extended failure to rectify.
36
 It thus tends to offset the considerations, mentioned in the previous 
                                                 
35
  One reason to think that the increase might be sub-linear, in at least some cases, is that, intuitively, repeated or 
temporally extended minor wrongdoing cannot give rise to a serious overall wrong even when repeated many 
times or extended over a long period. One reason to think that the increase might be supra-linear in some 
cases is that earlier wrongs might be thought to generate a special obligation not to commit further similar 
wrongs in the future. For a similar suggestion, see Christian Barry and Gerhard Øverland, “The Implications 
of Failing to Assist”, Social Theory and Practice 40(4) (2014): pp. 570–90. 
36
 This could be the case where the opportunity to rectify arises only on a single occasion. 
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sub-section, which suggested that a one-off failure to rectify a wrong is typically less seriously 
wrong than the initial wrong.  
 
Second, because the repeated and/or temporally extended nature of the wrongs of non-
rectification tends to increase their seriousness, it tends also to increase culpability; other things 
being equal, the perpetrator of a more serious wrong or set of wrongs is more culpable than the 
perpetrator of a less serious wrong or set of wrongs.  
 
But—and here is my third observation—the repeated and/or temporally extended nature of 
failures of rectification may also tend to increase culpability in another way. In cases of one-off 
time-limited wrongdoing, an agent’s culpability is often diminished by the fact that she had little 
time to reflect before deciding whether to perform the wrongful action. The lack of time may 
provide a partial excuse. It is much less likely that this excuse would apply in cases of repeated 
or temporally extended wrongdoing.
37
 
 
Finally, fourth, in at least some cases, it seems plausible that, even over a quite limited period of 
time, a person’s aggregate culpability for failure(s) to rectify a wrong is comparable to her 
culpability for the initial wrong. Consider a case in which A seriously assaults B and is then, over 
the subsequent five years, repeatedly presented with opportunities to substantially rectify this 
wrong by compensating, and issuing an apology to, these victims. Suppose further that A is 
                                                 
37
  Similar considerations have been offered in support of the view that first-time offenses should attract a 
punishment discount. See e.g., Andrew von Hirsch, Past or Future Crimes: Deservedness and Dangerousness 
in the Sentencing of Criminals (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1986), esp. at pp. 83-85; Andrew 
von Hirsch, “Criminal Record Rides Again”, Criminal Justice Ethics 10(2) (1991): pp. 2-5.  
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financially well off, so that offering the compensation would cost her little. In this sort of case, it 
might seem that A’s failures of rectification are, in aggregate, at least as serious as her initial wrong, 
and that her culpability for the failures of rectification is at least as great as that for the initial 
wrong, leaving aside any diminishment of initial culpability due to loss of psychological 
connectedness.  
C. The Rate of Psychological Disconnection 
I have identified two competing factors bearing on the amount of punishment that my recursive 
account can justify: the lesser wrongness of non-rectification will tend to diminish the amount of 
punishment that the account can justify; the repeated and perhaps temporally extended nature 
of the failures of rectification invoked by the account militates in the opposite direction. A third 
factor affects the balance between these two factors: the rate at which culpability and the 
obligation to rectify previous wrongs attenuate over time due to loss of psychological 
connectedness. This will affect the balance between the two aforementioned factors in two ways.  
 
First, it will affect the number of iterations of wrongdoing and failure to rectify that it is necessary 
to invoke to justify the claim that the perpetrator remains culpable. The more rapidly obligations 
to rectify attenuate, the more iterations we will need to invoke to get the result that, for instance, 
our Octogenarian remains culpable. If, due to the lesser wrongness of non-rectification, each 
iteration results in some loss of culpability, a greater number of iterations will tend to lead to a 
greater loss in culpability over time, and thus a reduction in the amount of punishment that the 
recursive account can justify.  
 
  
31 
Second, the rate at which culpability diminishes over time will affect how far back we can look in 
punishing the perpetrator of the distant past wrong. For instance, if culpability diminishes very 
quickly, it might be that our Octogenarian can be punished only for failures of rectification that 
he has committed over the preceding 5 years. If it diminishes slowly, it may be that he can be 
punished for failures of rectification over the previous 40 years, say.  
 
In order to determine the amount of (additional) punishment that can be justified by my recursive 
account we need, then, to balance (i) the lesser wrongness of non-rectification against (ii) the 
repeated and/or temporally extended nature of the failures of rectification invoked by the 
recursive account, in the light of (iii) the rate at which culpability and obligations to rectify 
attenuate over time due to loss of psychological connectedness.  
D. Degree of Rectification 
In many actual cases where the punishment of distant past wrongs is under consideration, a 
further factor will need to be considered: to what extent has the offender in fact rectified his 
earlier wrongs? I have, in this article, assumed throughout that the older self has expressed no 
remorse for the wrong of his younger self and has done nothing (else) to rectify it. But most real 
cases are not like this. Oksar Gröning, as I noted, offered some qualified expressions of remorse, 
and used his experiences to undermine holocaust denial. Both could be regarded as partially 
rectifying his earlier wrong, though I find it implausible that they do so to a great extent. Still, if 
there is partial rectification here, this will somewhat diminish the amount of punishment that can 
be justified on my account. 
